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2 the Virunga Massif. The annual revenue earned directly from gorilla tourism in these countries is currently estimated to be US$3 million, before the employment opportunities created are even considered (ICGP 2011) . Accounting for first-order multiplier effects, gorilla tourism contributes over US$20 million annually, apportioned between Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC (ICGP 2011).
However, even though these countries earn a lot of revenue from gorilla tourism, this revenue does not trickle down to the communities that shoulder the opportunity cost of land not used in agriculture and also suffer crop damage from gorillas. Given that in many cases national parks were created by directly displacing rural communities, benefit sharing helps reduce the sense of grievance that local communities feel toward their creation (Adams and Infield 2003; Schulz and Skonhoft 1996) . Consequently, benefit sharing must assume prominence, given the role of human interaction (via poaching, encroachment through agriculture or settlement, etc.) on possible extinction.
The current incentive scheme in the Virunga Massif entails sharing revenue from gorilla tourism with the local community. This is used to finance community projects for enhancing community welfare. The exact proportions shared differ for each of the three countries but range between 5% and 30%. Certainly the flow of revenue has helped win some compliance from local communities, even though local attitudes toward wildlife are still fairly negative (Adams and Infield 2003) . The current conservation outcomes could therefore be improved by changing the design of the incentive scheme.
The role of benefit sharing schemes has been discussed in similar contexts by Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) , Skonhoft and Solstad (1996) , Skonhoft (1998) , Fischer et al. 2011 , and Zabel et al. 2011 . Like Schulz and Skonhoft (1996 , we argue against merely compensating local communities for wildlife damages and call for benefit sharing schemes which attract local communities to undertake actions to allow the wildlife populations to grow. Poaching by local communities can be addressed more effectively by granting them property rights to wildlife because, without them, local communities base their illegal harvesting decisions on short-term considerations (Skonhoft and Solstad 1996) .
In a model with a land-use conflict between local agropastoralists and a park authority, Skonhoft (1998) introduces property rights by allowing the agropastoralists to share the profits from wildlife hunting and tourism. Where the agropastoralists receive a profit share from the tourist activity above that of the hunting benefit, the nuisance from the roaming wildlife will decrease because this scheme gives incentives for the park manager to increase the offtake and thereby decrease the wildlife stock in the long term. Therefore, there will be more livestock and a
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clear welfare gain for the agropastoralists compared to the situation where they have no property rights. Under certain conditions, the stock sizes will also be closer to what is optimal from an overall point of view. Consequently, Skonhoft 1998 supports devolution of ownership rights to the local agropastoralists to incentivise them to develop a long-term view about wildlife conservation.
Using a similar property rights structure, Fischer et al. (2011) shed more light on the welfare implications of such schemes by comparing two benefit sharing schemes involving sharing tourism revenue and shares of hunting licenses. They use a bioeconomic model that incorporates poaching by external agents and community anti-poaching enforcement. It turns out that the size of benefits granted and the design of benefit sharing schemes is crucial if resource sharing is to translate into meaningful conservation and welfare improvements. Fischer et al. (2011) argue that directly linking benefits to the actions of locals can result in significant conservation outcomes. Zabel et al. (2011) evaluate two policy approaches for carnivore conservation: ex-post compensation and performance payments. While both of the policies they evaluate have the capacity to enhance conservation outcomes, unconditional ex-post compensation is shown to have a distortionary effect on incentives to conserve. They argue that performance payments are more effective because of their direct link to specific conservation outcomes. Accordingly, this paper will propose a scheme that is more in line with the performance payment scheme in Zabel et al. (2011) , with the difference that, in our case, the primary motivation is not to compensate for damage inflicted on the local community but to grow the gorilla population. In addition, we will argue that it is the generation of adequate financial incentives, not the mere designation of communities as co-owners of wildlife, which encourages communities to have a long-term view in their interaction with wildlife Against the background that the gorilla has remained threatened, despite decades of research and many efforts to save it, this paper seeks to investigate the possible resolution of part of the poaching problem using benefit sharing schemes with local communities. Using a bioeconomic model, the paper investigates the conservation and welfare outcomes in the Virunga Massif of the revenue sharing scheme currently in place and a proposed performance-linked benefit sharing scheme in which the Park Agency makes payment to the local community based on the growth of the gorilla stock. The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a detailed background of the mountain gorillas" ecology and the key threats and current conservation efforts found in the Virunga Massif. Next, the bioeconomic model is outlined. Then
Environment for Development
4
the market equilibrium is discussed and compared with the social planner"s solution. Following that, current and alternative benefit-sharing schemes are discussed. The final section concludes.
Background to the Problem
The mountain gorilla exists naturally in two small, isolated populations, found in two locations which form their last remaining natural habitat. The Virunga Massif -situated on the slopes of extinct volcanoes along the borders of the DRC (the Mikeno sector of the Virunga National Park, 7900km²), Rwanda (Volcanoes National Park, 160km²) and Uganda (Mgahinga Gorilla National Park, 33.7km²) -is home to about two-thirds of the total gorilla population. The other population is found in Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) in south-west Uganda, At present, all mountain gorillas and their respective habitats are found in "protected"
areas. However, such protection is undermined by political and institutional instability, and by illegal hunting. 2 Recent concerns are poaching for the bushmeat trade and for the capture of infant gorillas, and the impact of civil conflict within the gorillas" range (UNEP Undated; Plumptre and Williamson 2001; IUCN 2010 , Kalpers et al. 2003 (Lanjouw et al. 2004 ).
2 Historically, the mountain gorilla has been at risk of extinction from various pressures at different times and in different areas. Threats have encompassed poaching, loss of habitat due to agricultural expansion, illegal cattle grazing, growing human population, destruction and fragmentation of habitat due to logging, mining and charcoal production, climate change, war, natural epidemics (e.g. Ebola), and the risk of diseases passed from humans to gorillas, which is a threat to habituated gorillas in areas of gorilla tourism (Plumptre and Williamson 2001; IUCN 2010; Robbins et al. 2009 ).
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Despite the recent recovery of the population, current threats of extinction are as real as they were in the 1950s. The current mountain gorilla population is less than the theoretical minimum for survival, meaning they are more vulnerable to stochastic catastrophic events such as outbreaks of disease and sudden loss of habitat (UNEP Undated).
While previous studies on the mountain gorilla in the Virunga region have indicated population viability for the next 100 years in the absence of external environmental perturbations (Harcourt 1995; Miller et al. 1998; Durant 2000 , cited in Kalpers et al. 2003 , conservative projections by UNEP in 2002 forecasted that the mountain gorillas" natural habitat will have shrunk to only 10% of its original range by 2032.
Gorilla Poaching
The threat of poaching is a challenge to gorilla conservation. Binyeri, Hibukabake and Kiyengo (2002) have documented instances of gorilla poaching in the DRC driven by the increasing demand by private foreign zoos for baby gorillas. Williamson and Fawcett (2008) have reported similar incidents for Rwanda. An infant can yield up to £86 000 on the black market (Vesperini 2002 , cited in UNEP -WCMC 2003 .
In most cases, infants can be captured only after killing the adults in the group, called silverbacks, who are meant to protect them (UNEP -WCMC 2003) . Moreover, there are often social consequences associated with the killing of a key member of a group such as a silverback.
This could cause the disintegration of an entire group. Silverbacks often kill the infants after gaining control of the group, following fights called "interactions," to establish dominance and to induce the females to start bearing infants again, as nursing mothers join new males. These infanticides in turn trigger population regression (UNEP Undated; Kalpers et al. 2003 ). This clearly shows the impact of increasing human interaction with natural processes in the absence of drastic action to halt this trend (Nellemann et al. 2010 ).
The Virunga region remains largely politically unstable, further increasing threats to gorillas (Kalpers et al. 2003; IUCN 2010) . Bringing an end to the activities of militias through halting the profits from illegal activities could stop the destruction of rain forests and mountain gorillas. In addition, isolation and low population numbers raise concerns about inbreeding (Kalpers et al. 2003; UNEP -WCMC 2003) .
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Habitat Loss
The Virunga region is under considerable pressure from competing land uses, most notably agriculture. Subsistence agriculture is the primary livelihood strategy for more than 90%
of the population in communities located around the parks (Plumptre and Williamson 2001) . The land surrounding the Virunga Massif is highly fertile because of volcanic deposits and is generally considered conducive to agriculture. Consequently, high human population densities (between 400 and 600 people per km²) are a common feature (Plumptre and Williamson 2001; Kalpers et al. 2003) . In addition, the national parks do not have buffer zones between the local communities and the parks" resource base. A proposal in 2000 to resettle refugees in the Volcano National Park, the deforestation in 2004 of 15km² in just one week for conversion to farmland in the Mikeno sector (NASA 2005) , and the sharp increase in timber extraction for the illegal production of charcoal clearly demonstrate the extent of the threat of habitat loss for gorillas.
Periodically, refugees have set up temporary structures in the Virunga National Park, putting further pressure on the habitat. The Virunga Massif is of enormous conservation importance as it encompasses areas of high irreplaceability and high vulnerability (Stage et al. 2005) . The current gorilla habitat and range is considered to be only a fraction of what it used to be; losing more habitat, therefore, will greatly endanger the survival of the remaining gorilla population (Plumptre and Williamson 2001) .
The recent recovery of the mountain gorilla populations indicates the potential of transboundary collaboration, and highlights the fact that, given adequate resources, these gains could be reinforced by an appropriately designed incentive scheme. Protected areas, regional collaboration and community involvement currently offer the main formal tools that, in theory, will protect the mountain gorillas and preserve biodiversity in the Virunga region (Nellemann et al. 2010; Skonhoft 2005) . This is crucial, because the probability of extinction of a species depends fundamentally on the quantity and quality of its ecological habitat.
Recently there has been increased emphasis on community involvement and regional collaboration. Community initiatives have included revenue sharing schemes and provided alternative livelihoods which do not threaten wildlife. These arise from the recognition that, when traditional rights and access shift in a way that disadvantages local communities, little incentive is created to exploit resources in a sustainable manner (Damania et al. 2003; Johannesen and Skonhoft 2005) . However, lack of institutional capacity is proving an obstacle (Adams and Infield 2003) . In addition, given the insignificant magnitude of the benefits per person from revenue sharing -about US$0.36 per year in Rwanda (Nielsen and Spenceley 2010) Environment for Development Mukanjari et al.
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-there is a need for careful design of the scheme so that it has a more pronounced first-order impact on the local community.
Gorilla Tourism
Increasing pressure on the land has been the driving force behind gorilla tourism, in the hope that if gorillas can "pay their way," then this could increase the opportunity cost of their natural habitat. Where gorilla tourism has developed, mountain gorillas have become an economic asset of national importance. Gorilla tourism dates back to 1979 and 1984 in Rwanda and the DRC respectively, while official gorilla tourism in Uganda was established in 1991. The strong demand for gorilla tracking offers the possibility for sustained wealth generation from wildlife. To consolidate the benefits of tourism, institutions need to be devised such that the gorilla "pays its way" to the satisfaction of all parties (Adams and Infield 2003) . However, gorilla tourism is not without challenges; it exposes gorillas to humans and hence to any diseases that humans may be carrying, thereby greatly exposing immunologically naïve populations (Plumptre and Williamson 2001) . 3 In addition to possible stress during the habituation process, 4 habituation increases risks to the gorillas from poachers and military rebels in the forest (Plumptre and Williamson 2001) . Ultimately, the future sustainability and success of gorilla tourism hinges on the ability to attract high-end, low-impact tourist visitors.
The Bioeconomic Model
As noted above, there are several actors operating in the Virunga region: park agencies for each of the three countries, local communities in the vicinity of the national parks, and military rebels. In this section, this paper builds a simple bioeconomic model to capture the interaction between broad groups of the different actors. To ensure tractability and allow us to deal only with poaching involving the local community, it considers only two key economic The Park Agency has the mandate to care for the gorillas, manage tourism and collect tourism revenues from gorilla tracking, mountain climbing and other related activities. It is assumed that there is no harvesting by the Park Agency even though there is poaching by the local community.
The local community engages in agricultural production, as well as poaching, especially of infant gorillas for sale on the international market to private foreign zoos. The local community allocates its fixed endowment of labour effort ) (N between the two activities, namely agricultural production ) ( Enforcement against poaching is done by the Park Agency, which receives the fines levied on poachers. Thus, gorilla poaching involves the risk or probability of being caught ) ( .
The probability of detection is affected by the level of the Park Agency"s anti-poaching effort ) (E , and the local community"s harvesting effort However, we focus only on poaching by the local community for two reasons. First, poaching by agents such as a militia requires a policy response from national government rather than the parks agency, e.g. deployment of the army. Second, poaching by external agents such as commercial gangs is usually aided by locals who are more knowledgeable about the area. Once the incentives of the local collaborators have been removed, then poaching by external agents will likely subside. In fact, Fischer et al. (2011) show that linking benefits of conservation to the actions of locals can result in significant conservation outcomes even after incorporating poaching by external agents. 6 In reality, even though property rights are well defined, lack of enforcement results in encroachment, but that does not entail legally owning any additional land. Encroachment is a costless process. Because land is fixed, there is direct competition between the two agents. Encroachment of agricultural activities benefits the local communities but does so at the expense of the Park Agency, as it entails a significant reduction in gorilla habitat.
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We assume that
increasing function of the level of anti-poaching effort and time spent on poaching gorillas, respectively. In addition, 0  g EN  , implying that, as the level of anti-poaching effort increases, the probability of being detected increases at the margin.
While the intention of poachers is mainly to capture infant gorillas for sale to foreign zoos, in reality the capture of infants involves killing adult group members, as they normally protect the infants (Nellemann et al. 2010) . Poaching therefore affects the entire gorilla population, motivating the modeling of the total gorilla stock rather than a sub-population.
Assuming that the poacher"s remuneration for each infant gorilla caught is s and that the harvest/offtake function of gorillas is
, the payoff function from gorilla poaching is given by:
where g N is the effort expended on poaching, w is the cost per unit of effort,  is the fixed fine per unit poached when detected, and  is the fraction of infants in the gorilla offtake. It should be noted that the local community does not directly decide on the amount of gorilla offtake. Instead, it decides on the amount of labour to allocate to poaching, g N which along with other variables determines the level of gorilla offtake. In addition, even though h is the ultimate gorilla offtake by poachers, revenue is derived from infants ( h
, implying that a higher stock induces a higher illegal offtake, and that 0 /
meaning that an increase in anti-poaching effort gives rise to reduced illegal offtake through increasing the probability of detection. Furthermore,
: as anti-poaching effort increases, poaching will decline, at an increasing rate. Therefore the function h is convex in E . There is revenue sharing between the locals and the Park Agency with regard to the gross revenues from tourism. The locals are assumed to get a share α of the revenues from gorilla 7 Poaching effort has two effects: infant gorillas are captured and adult gorillas are killed while protecting their infants. Dead adult gorillas can be sold for bushmeat or trophies. However, there is a very small market for this in the Congo Basin (Nellemann et al. 2010) . Hence, to keep the analysis tractable, we assume that dead adult gorillas have no value in our model. Of course, the implicit assumption is that poachers can only be effectively apprehended and fined if found in possession of evidence, i.e. infant gorillas, rather than just a gun, even when they have killed an adult gorilla. w is the imputed wage rate (price of labour), which is assumed to be predetermined because of the general possibility of off-farm employment; a p is the fixed market price of agricultural output, which is assumed to be exogenously determined for the local community because there exists a national market for agricultural output; and ) ( a N Q is the total agricultural production function, and is assumed to be characterised by constant returns to scale. It is assumed that 0
Thus the local community"s net benefit from agricultural and wildlife actives is given by:
Equation (6) gives the Park Agency"s net benefit from wildlife activities in the presence of a revenue sharing scheme with the local community. 8 All the above assumptions are in line with reality. The local community in Rwanda currently gets about 5% of the net revenue. In Uganda, 20% of park revenues go the same way (Stage et al. 2005 ). In the DRC, 30% of the cost of the gorilla tracking permit goes to the local community (Virunga National Park 2010).
9 Production activities such as actual tourist numbers are not explicitly modelled in the revenue function. Revenue is assumed to be related to the gorilla biomass, and
, implying that, all other factors remaining constant, a large biomass induces increased tourist visits but at a decreasing rate, as there will be more habituated gorillas to be visited. In reality, the number of visitors allowed depends on both the size of the gorilla group and the number of habituated groups. For example, in the Virunga National Park, six tourists are allowed to visit a gorilla family consisting of 10 or more individuals, while only four tourists are permitted to visit a gorilla family with fewer than 10 individuals. While the total number of tourists visiting the gorilla families depends on the number of habituated gorilla families, at present a maximum of 30 tourists are permitted per day (Virunga National Park 2010). 
The total cost of managing the park and the gorillas in each time period is ) , ( E G c , which is assumed to depend on the gorilla stock as well as the anti-poaching effort. The Park Agency therefore faces costs associated with controlling and securing the benefits from the gorillas and their habitat by exerting anti-poaching effort (E). Such costs could be in the form of equipping and paying an anti-poaching unit. In return, the Park Agency receives three types of benefits: (i) share of revenue from gorilla tourism,
, and (iii) the public good value of the gorilla stock,
. Endangered charismatic and rare species such as the gorilla often confer a public good value. It can take the form of existence value, bequest value or option value. 10 It is assumed that
The production activities taking place inside the park (namely tourism and poaching of gorillas) are constrained by the gorilla stock dynamics. The change in the gorilla stock over time will be equal to the natural growth of the gorillas, less the illegal offtake. 
, where  is the intrinsic rate of growth of the gorilla stock and K is the carrying capacity of the park, which is the gorilla habitat. It is also assumed that
. The natural growth of the gorilla ) (G F incorporates several factors, including the size of the habitat, the current structure of land use and gorilla mortality from disease and war.
10 On the one hand, where the public good is national, government incentives are necessary. On the other hand, where the public good is global, trade or international transfers are often needed. (Myers et al. 1995) .
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Market Equilibrium Compared to Social Optimum
In the market equilibrium, both the local community and Park Agency legally benefit from revenue from gorilla tourism. However, the local community and the Park Agency pursue individual interests and consequently act uncooperatively. The local community is involved in poaching and ignores the public good value of the gorilla stock. The Park Agency takes the public good value of the gorilla stock into account and exerts anti-poaching enforcement to protect the gorilla. The local community makes decisions about labour allocation between its two livelihood activities while the Park Agency makes a decision about the level of anti-poaching enforcement. The local community takes the anti-poaching enforcement E as given, while the Park Agency takes the local community"s poaching effort g N as given until equilibrium poaching effort and anti-poaching enforcement values are attained.
12
The Local Community's Problem
The decisions to be made by the local community relate to how much labour to allocate to gorilla poaching, g N , and how much to allocate to agriculture, a N . Given the existence of a labour constraint shown in equation (1), a decision on how much effort to allocate to one activity already implies a certain allocation to the other activity. Thus, the local community is confronted by the following maximisation problem, where the labour constraint has already been substituted:
As shown in Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) , the local community does not base its poaching decision on intertemporal considerations, because it does not have property rights over the gorilla, while effective enforcement in subsequent periods might completely curtail its poaching. Uncertainty regarding the local community"s ability to expropriate from the park in the future motivates it to disregard sustainable use of the gorilla.
The first-order condition with respect to poaching effort is:
12 One form the interaction between the two agents might take is sequential. The local community first chooses poaching effort 
Thus, the local community will allocate labour to gorilla poaching according to the optimality condition given by equation (9). The marginal benefit of poaching effort consists of three components. The term
is the marginal (financial) value of poaching effort to the local community in terms of the value of the infants captured and sold. The term
shows the marginal value (loss) to the local community in terms of the expected value of fines upon being apprehended and fined because of additional investment in poaching effort. The term
shows the marginal value (loss) to the local community in terms of the value of fines upon being apprehended and fined when the risk of detection increases because of additional investment in poaching effort.
The Park Agency's Problem
The decision to be made by the Park Agency is how much anti-poaching enforcement E to invest in. Because the Park Agency has a legal right to exploit the gorilla for tourism and for its public good value, it has a long-term view, and therefore takes the dynamics of the gorilla stock into account. However, the Park Agency is likely to use a discount rate  which is different from that used by the social planner. The Park Agency therefore faces the following problem, subject to the dynamics of the gorilla stock (7) 
The following expression can be obtained from the first-order condition:
13 In reality, Park Agencies may not really be expected to optimise, in the sense of maximising the present value of net benefits; they may only care about certain ecological outcomes, for example maintaining the stock of gorillas at a specific level. However, in reality they may also have to optimise, in the sense of maximising the present value of net benefits, given that they need resources for conservation, which is not adequately supported in Africa. 
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The Park Agency will deploy anti-poaching effort up to the point where the marginal cost of the anti-poaching effort
is equal to its marginal benefit. The marginal benefit of anti-poaching enforcement consists of three components. The term
shows the marginal (financial) value to the Park Agency in terms of the value of fines receivable upon apprehension of poachers when the risk of detection increases due to increased anti-poaching enforcement. The term
is the marginal (shadow) value to the Parks Agency of gorillas saved from poaching because of increased anti-poaching enforcement, while the term
shows the marginal (financial) valuation by the Park Agency of fines receivable lost because of decreased offtake following additional investment in anti-poaching enforcement.
The co-state equation is given as
The Park Agency would maintain the gorilla stock at a level that equates the return from the gorilla with the return from alternative assets. The marginal revenue from gorilla tourism is weighted by the share of such revenue accruing to the Park Agency. In steady state,
Therefore, it can be shown from the co-state equation (12) 
The market equilibrium levels of poaching effort * g N , anti-poaching effort * E and the stock of the gorilla * G , can be computed from equations (7), (9) and (11). The steady-state offtake of the gorilla by the local community can be solved for by substituting these values into the harvesting function ) , , (
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The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner chooses poaching effort and anti-poaching enforcement to maximise the present value of net benefits from agricultural and gorilla activities, including the public good value of the gorilla stock. Therefore, subject to the labour constraint (1) and the dynamics of the gorilla stock (7), the social planner is confronted with the following maximisation problem:
The current-value Hamiltonian function is therefore given in equation (15) 
where  is the co-state variable and the current value of the shadow price of a gorilla at any time t . The shadow price measures the approximate decrease in the present value of net benefits resulting from a unit decrease in the gorilla stock. The first order condition with respect to poaching effort is given by: 
14 It should be noted that by including revenues from poaching we are not judging it as a social good; in fact revenue from poaching is only considered good by certain groups of society, not by everyone. However, the role of the social planner is to balance the revenues (i.e. goods) and costs (i.e. bads) faced by different groups in society. Accordingly, as long as certain groups find revenue from poaching good (i.e. receive this revenue) then it will necessarily feature positively in the social planner"s problem. The inclusion of the benefits of poaching in the social planner"s problem is in line with existing literature and reflects the fact that these benefits accrue to a group that is part of the society (see for example Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2005) . Excluding revenue from poaching will underestimate the total benefits associated with gorillas and will underestimate the level of incentives required to reduce poaching.
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The social planner will allocate labour between agriculture and gorilla poaching until the value of the marginal product of labour allocated to each activity is equalized. The marginal benefit of labour allocated to poaching consists of two components related to the valuations by the two agents for whom the social planner decides: the term
shows the marginal (financial) value of poaching effort to the local community in terms of the value of the infants captured and sold, while the term
shows the marginal (shadow) loss of poaching effort to the Parks Agency in terms of its effect on the gorilla stock.
The first order condition with respect to anti-poaching effort can be stated as: 
Equation (11') states that the social planner should deploy anti-poaching effort up to the point where the marginal (financial) cost of the anti-poaching effort
is equal to its marginal benefit. The marginal benefit consists of two components related to the valuations by the two agents for whom the social planner decides: the term 
The social planner would therefore maintain the gorilla stock at a level that equates the return from gorillas with the return from alternative assets. The return from the gorilla stock is in terms of the change in the marginal valuation of the gorilla stock and stock effects on revenue from gorilla tourism, cost of anti-poaching enforcement, revenue from sale of infant gorillas by the local community, and natural growth of the gorilla stock including offtake. In steady state,
. From the co-state equation (12') and the stock dynamics equation (7), it can be shown that the steady-state shadow value of the gorilla stock is 
The steady state equilibrium levels of poaching effort (7), (9') and (11'). Subsequently, one can solve for the steady state offtake of the gorilla by the local community by substituting these values into the harvesting function ) , , (
Comparison with the Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium and socially optimal levels of poaching effort, anti-poaching effort and the stock of the gorilla can be assessed by comparing equations (9) and (11) to (9') and (11') respectively. From equations (9) and (9'), where 0 1    , the value of marginal product of labour allocated to agriculture is lower and the return from poaching effort is higher in the market equilibrium than in the social planner"s solution.
15 Consequently, the value of g N will be higher in the market equilibrium and lower in the social planner"s solution. One of the policies which could be used to redistribute effort from poaching to agriculture is to make the agricultural activity more valuable. However, this is only true where the human population does not exceed the carrying capacity of the available agricultural land. If the population is already excessive for the agricultural land available, then more valuable agricultural activity would lead to the opening up of parklands for agriculture. In fact, Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) show that policies to conserve wildlife by increasing agricultural productivity in areas neighbouring protected areas might be inappropriate because increasing agricultural product prices in an area with massive population pressure will lead to a lower wildlife stock size in the long run. The area in question is thought to be under severe population pressure, which is one of the reasons why the local community tolerates poaching, so as to free up more land for their agricultural activities rather than for gorilla conservation. Thus, we should focus on policies such as benefit sharing schemes which do not necessarily increase the scale of agriculture. Comparing the optimality conditions 15 That is,
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(11) and (11') for anti-poaching enforcement reveals that * * sp E E  , i.e. anti-poaching enforcement will be higher in the market equilibrium and lower in the social planner"s solution.
From the above comparisons, it is therefore clear that the gorilla stock is larger for the social planner, i.e. (13) and (13'), it may be noted that the optimal shadow value of the gorilla stock is higher in the social planner"s scenario. This is because the marginal returns in the social planner"s solution are higher than in the market equilibrium, i.e.
because the social planner also takes into account the marginal valuations of the gorilla stock by the local community (i.e. the local community"s marginal revenue from poaching and the local community"s share of marginal revenue from gorilla tourism).
Analysis of Benefit Sharing Schemes
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the market equilibrium gorilla stock in central Africa is suboptimal, even in the presence of the current revenue sharing scheme. In fact, the gorilla stock will not reach its socially optimal level in the market equilibrium, with or without a revenue sharing scheme. In the case where 0   , i.e. where there is no revenue sharing scheme -implying that all tourism-related income accrues to the Park Agencyequations (9) and (11) reveal that the market equilibrium amounts of poaching effort and antipoaching enforcement would not be materially different from those in the presence of revenue sharing. Thus, the revenue sharing scheme has no effect on conservation outcomes because it is not internalised by the local community. However, revenue sharing obviously has an effect on community welfare insofar as it provides additional income. In central Africa, the local community"s share of proceeds from gorilla tourism is invested in social infrastructure such as schools and water tanks (Nielsen and Spenceley 2010) .
In order to align the market equilibrium with the social planner"s solution, a different intervention will be needed. On the side of the local community, a market equilibrium outcome similar to the social planner"s solution can be achieved by setting the fine in such a way that equations (9) and (9') are equalized. Starting with equalized marginal benefits of poaching effort, 
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The expression for *  has the interpretation of an optimal fine, which, if imposed on the local community for poaching, potentially ensures a market equilibrium outcome similar to the social planners" solution. Therefore, instead of setting the fine arbitrarily, the poaching fine has to cover the full cost of poaching actions, which disincentivises poaching. However, obtaining the necessary information about some of the arguments required to compute the optimal fine is a challenge. 16 Furthermore, an optimal fine does not incentivize the local community to take a long-term view of its interaction with the gorilla stock. As a result, an optimal fine alone will not bring convergence between the market equilibrium and the social planner"s solution.
The devolution of property rights over wildlife has been suggested in the literature as a solution (see Solstad 1998 and Songorwa 1999 , for example). However, the mere designation of the local community as co-owners of wildlife has not brought sustained conservation practices for some communities (for example, CAMPFIRE communities in Zimbabwe, as studied by Fischer et al. 2011) . Such participatory schemes rely heavily on active community involvement in areas such as problem identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Songorwa 1999 ) and the community expects an adequate payoff for its continued engagement. In order for devolution of property rights to positively affect conservation practices, it needs to simultaneously bring tangible benefits to the local communities.
Performance-linked Benefit Sharing Scheme
We propose a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme in which the Park Agency pays the local community a payment directly linked to the growth in the gorilla stock. Zabel et al.
(2011) have suggested a similar scheme for tiger conservation in India, where predation incidents greatly impact households" income and retaliatory killing threatens endangered carnivore
16 While reforming the current revenue sharing scheme by moving toward the optimal fine might move gorilla conservation toward social optimality, the policy imposes a huge regulatory burden on the Park Agency due to its enormous information requirements. Regulators often do not possess the superior information possessed by poachers, who have no incentive to share it with the regulators. Not only does the Park Agency have to decide how large the optimal fine ) ( *  should be, the Agency also has to define the optimal enforcement effort. Here the Agency would have to grapple with evaluating the effect of an increase in enforcement officers, compared to initiatives such as giving them additional high-tech enforcement equipment or upgrading their skills levels. This is further compounded by the fact that the Park Agency interacts with the local community in a dynamic set up and hence an optimal policy could be rendered suboptimal in the next period of interaction.
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species" survival. This alternative benefit sharing scheme has two advantages over the current revenue sharing scheme: the local community"s welfare is enhanced as it earns more from the gorilla and the local community is incentivized to take a long-term view of its interaction with the gorilla stock, as payments are based on the dynamics of its stock.
To assess its impacts, the proposed alternative benefit sharing scheme can now be incorporated into the local community and Park Agency"s maximisation problems, where the payment for the growth in the gorilla stock ( G  as defined in equation 7) is denoted by  . The local community is now confronted by the following maximisation problem, subject to the labour constraint (1) 
The first order condition with respect to poaching effort is given as:
Here, the marginal benefit from poaching effort differs from its counterpart in the social planner"s solution.
17 However, the comparison between equations (18) and ( local community due to poaching effort displacing payments receivable had there been no additional offtake, which could have added to the gorilla stock. Consequently, the local community will desist from poaching because it can earn more from an intact gorilla stock than 17 The marginal benefit from poaching effort is also lower than the market equilibrium marginal benefit shown in equation (10') by the term . In some ways, the proposed benefit sharing scheme could be quantitatively similar to a high fine policy. However, the fine policy is reactive and only affects the local community with a probability of θ, while the proposed benefitsharing scheme is proactive and always affects the local community as long as there is stock growth.
The Park Agency maximizes the following problem, subject to the dynamics of the gorilla stock in equation (7) 
The first order condition can be expressed as: To summarize, the proposed benefit sharing scheme involves the Park Agency paying the local community an amount of money directly linked to the growth in the gorilla stock. This scheme would simultaneously set the fine for poaching the gorilla to zero while setting the payment to the local community at  , which is equal to the shadow price of gorillas. The performance-linked benefit sharing scheme would guarantee the growth in the gorilla stock to a level consistent with social optimality with no offtake. Because the incentives going to the local community are linked to the gorilla stock, an increase in the stock of the gorilla directly
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translates into an increase in income going to the local community and therefore enhanced community welfare.
The Potential for Extracting Surplus Rents
While the above scheme guarantees social optimality, the implementation of such a scheme requires significant financial resources. The payment of ψ (which should equal the shadow value of the gorilla) to the local community implies that the local community receives an amount made up of both the financial and non-financial benefits associated with the gorilla, because the shadow value also embodies non-use values of the gorilla, e.g. existence, bequest
and option values. This poses challenges to the viability of the scheme because the gorilla tourism revenue accruing to the Park Agency is only with respect to the use value of the gorilla.
As a starting point, additional financial resources could be generated by reforming the In addition, the international community must have an interest in supporting conservation financially beyond tourism visits, because the price for gorilla tracking permits only equates to the private benefit and not the public benefit associated with the gorilla. External financial support for benefit sharing schemes around gorilla conservation could therefore be the financial expression of Z(G). One practical way to raise external financial support might be to impose a gorilla conservation levy on all international visitors at the ports of entry into the gorilla states.
The resultant revenues would then be earmarked for the gorilla benefit sharing scheme. This could therefore help address the potential financial shortfall associated with a performancelinked benefit sharing scheme.
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Discussion
Local communities will engage in poaching as long as the return from such activities exceeds the returns from alternative activities. This is partly fuelled by the high incidence of poverty in these areas. Therefore, in order to persuade communities living in the vicinity of the gorilla habitat to be partners in gorilla conservation, a stable flow of financial resources linked to their cooperation in gorilla conservation is required. It is important that disbursements are linked to the attainment of specific conservation goals (Ferraro and Simpson 2002, Zabel et al. 2011 ), e.g. the growth in the stock of the gorilla.
The proposed performance-linked benefit sharing scheme only requires the Park Agency to do a regular census and thereafter make payments accordingly, thereby reducing the burden on the regulator and encouraging self-monitoring by the local community. Conducting gorilla censuses is already the mandate of the Park Agency. In addition, the Park Agency does not need to know anything about the local poaching community"s behavior because the proposed scheme is incentive-compatible with an inbuilt driver of permanency of good behavior by the local community. Moreover, locals face an implicit fine should they decide to poach, as their hidden actions are revealed in the next gorilla census and thus penalised accordingly. With a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme, the local community is effectively locked into a binding contract with the Park Agency and therefore assumes full responsibility for the stock dynamics. Because any action that enhances the gorilla stock directly translates into increased transfers to the local community, the local community might become proactive in resource conservation.
If the importance of tourism in supporting gorilla conservation and the current benefit scheme is recognised, then there is a need to consolidate the current tourism gains through the "harmonisation" of rules and regulations, as this would reduce costly competition and strengthen collaboration. Because the benefit sharing scheme is mainly about sharing tourism gains, integrating activities would reduce costs and ultimately increase the amount available for gorilla conservation. It would allow the exploitation of country-specific attractions such as active and inactive volcanoes, lakes, bird viewing, and different cultures, which could all enrich the tourism experience and boost revenue. At the same time, this calls for the implementation of an optimal pricing strategy. The attractiveness of a regional transboundary initiative lies in its possible ability to insulate the economic activities in the area from political instability. Though not addressed directly by this study, this is an area ripe for further investigation.
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Another important consideration not directly deriving from this model is the need for the benefit sharing scheme to incorporate the heterogeneity of the Virunga Massif in terms of tourism revenue generation capacity. Some sectors are likely to generate less revenue because of infrastructure differences and political instability, in addition to having fewer habituated gorillas.
In such instances, Muchapondwa and Ngwaru (2010) argue that benefit sharing will help to solve transboundary environmental conservation problems if there is substantial cross-subsidisation in the short to medium term. It follows that the equalisation of benefits across the three countries would assume prominence, because unequal benefit sharing schemes might give rise to unequal cooperation. 18 This is important, given the current variation in the proportions going to local communities in the three countries. Therefore, the focus should be on effectively managing the entire Virunga Massif, rather than portions thereof, in order to consolidate the current gains in gorilla conservation.
Conclusion
Conserving the endangered gorilla in Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is characterised by slow population growth and facing a multitude of threats, is a daunting task. This paper sets out to investigate the possible resolution of the poaching problem using benefit sharing schemes with local communities. Using a bioeconomic model, the paper demonstrates that the current revenue sharing scheme with the local communities yields suboptimal conservation outcomes. To this end, the paper also considers an alternative benefit sharing scheme which involves the Park Agency paying the local community an amount of money directly linked to the growth in the gorilla stock. It is shown that a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme can achieve socially optimal conservation. Through linking payments to the stock growth, the local community explicitly takes into account the gorilla stock dynamics.
The scheme renders poaching effort by the local community, poaching fines on the local community and anti-poaching enforcement against the local community unnecessary. The oligopolistic interdependence between the only three countries offering gorilla tourism offers the prospect of extracting surplus rents which could be channeled towards more gorilla conservation.
Given the huge financial outlay requirements for the ideal benefit sharing scheme, the Park 18 Due to the high irreplaceability associated with the area, investing in sensitising the main actors in the Virunga Massif (i.e. local communities, the Park Agency and military rebels) is crucial for gathering support for the benefit sharing scheme.
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Agencies in Central Africa could reap more financial benefits for use in conservation if they employ an oligopolistic pricing strategy for gorilla tourism. The dynamic nature and severity of the threats to the gorillas mean that there is a need for ongoing, active involvement of all stakeholders. Equal benefit sharing among the three countries could significantly enhance the effectiveness of the benefit sharing scheme. It is therefore important to manage the area as a single park with a common objective. 
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Appendix A. Figure 1 shows the Virunga Conservation Area, which contains the Virunga National Park (Parc National des Virunga) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Mgahinga Gorilla National Park in Uganda, the Volcanoes National Park (Parc National des Volcans) in Rwanda and the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) in south-west Uganda, on the border with the DRC.
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Appendix B. 
